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ABSTRACT

Profitability of U.S. poultry industry is affected by

developments in the world markets, although in the past it
has appeared to be insulated.

The European Community (EC) is in the process of

creating a single, unified European market in 1992.

This

economic integration will have a significant impact on

poultry producers both inside and outside the EC, especially
due to the adoption of new standards and the removal of
Monetary Compensatory Amounts (MCAs).

The objective of this study is to describe the current
efforts to enhance economic

integration within the European

Community and to analyze how its implementation may affect
the U.S. poultry industry.

This was accomplished by

estimating the demand for U.S. poultry in the five largest

EC importing nations which accounted for 54 percent of total
value of U.S. poultry exports to the EC, and the rest of the

EC as an aggregated group.

The sum of their poultry demand

was incorporated in a U.S. export supply function to
determine the effect of changes in EC demand on the U.S.
export price.

The results indicate that the EC's domestic poultry

prices EC have a greater impact on poultry exports than the
U.S. export price. The results suggest that harmonization

of prices that lead to a 1 percent fall in poultry prices
will result in a 1.6 to 2.7 percent fall in the quantity of

U.S. poultry demanded.

However, U.S. export prices are not

expected to be greatly affected.
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CHAPTER 1
IMTRODUCTION

Historically, the United States poultry industry has
been insulated from developments in international markets.

Nonetheless, the economic well being of the U.S. poultry

industry is becoming increasingly influenced by developments
in world markets.

As a result, U.S. poultry producers must

recognize how changes in world markets affect the domestic
poultry industry. Thus, this study examines the extent to
vhich the economic harmonization in the European Community

(EC)^ may affect the potential for the U.S. poultry exports
to the EC market.

Under the labels "Greater Economic Integration," and

"1992," the EC is in the process of eliminating most, if not
all, internal restraints to trade by December 31, 1992.
These restraints include free movement of goods, people,

seirvices and capital within the EC. However, the adoption
of new standards and regulations that may affect U.S. export

opportunities for poultry and poultry products in the EC is
of concern to U.S. poultry exporters.

Even if European

economies achieve only partial harmonization, the results

^European Community (EC). Also referred to as the
Community. An economic customs union originally composed of

six members - Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy, West

Germany, and the Netherlands. Denmark, Ireland, and the United

Kingdom (UK) became members January 1, 1973. Greece joined

January 1, 1981. Spain and Portugal became members January 1,
1986. EC refers to the present Community of 12 nations.

could be significant for the U.S. poultry industry.

One

example of the possible impacts is the 1989 directive that
banned the use of growth hormones in livestock production.
This directive resulted in U.S. beef producers losing an
estimated $100 million in beef exports to the EC (Sherer,

1990).

American producers are already aware of the

implications of European harmonization.

However, further

analysis is needed to assess future implications. Previous
studies have examined the EC's export subsidies, grain

policies and the elimination of these programs on U.S.

poultry trade (Alston, Alston and Scobie, and Gleckler and
Tweeten). However, they did not examine the effects of
harmonization of the EC poultry support prices on U.S.
poultry trade.

In examining the implications of the 1992 economic
harmonization programs, the current efforts to enhance

economic integration within the European Community will be
described.

The main objective, however, is to analyze how

the implementation of the economic harmonization program
will affect U.S. poultry exports to the EC. This will be

accomplished by first estimating quantity demand for U.S.

poultry in the five largest markets in the EC (West Germany,
Greece, Italy, Netherlands and U.K.). Second, quantity
demand for U.S. poultry by the minor markets, comprising the
rest of the EC countries will be estimated as an aggregated

group. U.S. poultry export quantity and price to the EC

will, respectively, equal the sum of the quantity demand for
U.S. poultry, and the average price to all the EC markets.
Last, U.S. export price of poultry to the EC will be
estimated to determine principal influences affecting U.S.
exports of poultry to the EC.

The results of this study will provide a tool for both

policy makers and poultry exporters to enable them see the
possible direction of U.S. poultry trade with the EC after
the harmonization program.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The political institutions in the EC recognized the
need for improvements in the farming sectors of member
states.

This recognition led to the implementation of the

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

CAP was designed to

regulate the production and movement of agricultural and
food commodities into, within and out of the EC.

Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome, 1957, stated the

objectives of the CAP to include ;

1) Increasing agricultural productivity through
technical progress and optimum utilization of labor; 2)

maintaining a fair standard of living for the rural

population, by increasing earnings of persons in
agriculture; 3) stabilizing the EC markets through common

price supports; 4) ensuring consistent supplies of
agricultural commodities; and 5) ensuring reasonable
consumer prices.

The CAP has attempted to achieve these objectives

using complex agrimonetary systems and various price support
mechanisms.

The agrimonetary systems comprise the Unit of

Account (UA), the Green Rates and the Monetary Compensatory
Amounts. The CAP'S price supports include the domestic,
import and export mechanisms.

The European Agrimonetary Systems

The EC established the "Unit of Account" (UA) in 1962.

The UA was used as a monetary denominator for fixing policy

prices and other financial transactions of the CAP. It was
defined as the amount of gold (0.88867088 gram) equal to the
value of a U.S. dollar.

EC policy prices, subsidies and

other monetary aggregates in UA were converted into each

country's currency by a set of Agricultural conversion
rates.

At first, the rates were based on the market

exchange rates, and changes in the market exchange rates
were reflected by equal changes in the conversion rates.

This arrangement guaranteed the same level of policy prices

throughout the Community, irrespective of the currency in
which they were expressed.

The CAP'S objective of common

prices was therefore satisfied, at least temporarily.
Unfortunately, the breakdown in the system of fixed

exchange rates in the early 1970's resulted in : 1) ^ set
of rates that differ from market rates;

2) the breakdown in

common pricing; 3) system of border taxes and subsidies
that distorted trade patterns; and 4) large administrative
costs to the Community.

"Green Rates"

The breakdown of the system of fixed exchange rates in

the early 1970's was followed by exchange rate adjustments
for some EC countries.

To prevent the transmission of

exchange rate changes into their agricultural prices,
countries such as France and Germany sought reprieve from

the common pricing system.

They were allowed to use the old

exchange rates to convert CAP price supports into national
currency. Hence, the birth of "green rates," conversion
rates different from the market exchange rates.

The result

was disparity in various support prices between EC member
countries.

Compensating systems of taxes and subsidies on

agricultural products were applied at borders to stabilize
differences in support prices.

Consequently, prices for

agricultural products varied within the EC, thus, negating
the objective of common prices.

Monetary compensatory Amounts - MCAs

Had the market been allowed to adjust itself, producers

in countries with lower prices would have exported their
commodities to countries with higher prices.

Eventually,

prices in the EC would have come to equilibrium. Instead,
border taxes and subsidies known as Monetary Compensatory

Amounts (MCAs) were established.

MCAs act as taxes on

exports and subsidies on imports of weaker currency

countries, and as subsidies on exports and taxes on imports
of stronger currency countries.

In general, prices in EC nations vary due to differing
production costs and the protection efforts. These price
variations were, in part, the results of the CAP'S

agrimonetary systems.

Various price support mechanisms were

introduced to relax the effects of the agrimonetary systems
and facilitate market stability.

CAP'S Price Support Mechanisms

Figure 1 illustrates the principal components of the
CAP'S price support mechanisms.

The Council, the EC

decision making body, used the UA to set CAP'S target prices
for agricultural products and also establish intervention

prices that guarantee minimum producer prices at which
government agencies would intervene and buy the products for

Community storage.

These prices form the range of domestic

price level, and make up the principal domestic producer
price support mechanism.

MCAs are approximately equal to

the difference in the intervention prices between countries
(Swinbank).

The Sluicegate Price (SGP), together with various

Import Levies are the import mechanism used to protect EC

producers from imported poultry. SGPs are set quarterly by
the EC Commission.

The SGPs are the minimum prices at which

non-EC poultry may reach an EC port of entry. They are based
on the cost of production of broilers in a typical non-EC

country that exports broilers to the EC.

To keep producer

prices above Intervention and close to Target price,
importers are charged various import levies on top of the
SGPs.

Price

Target

EC Market Price

Export refunds

Range of
Import Levy

Domestic Price
Intervention

[(Guaranteed
]Minimum to
Producer)

World

Sluice
Gate

Market

I

price

Domestic Mechanisms

Import Mechanisms

Export Mechanisms

1

Figure 1

Source:

Levy

EC

Export

CollactloM

Budget

Refund*

t

CAP PRICE SUPPORT MECHANISM

Adapted from The Basic Mechanisms of European

Community (EC) Farm Policy. USDA, ERS
Miscellaneous Publication No. 1285.

Basic Import Leyies are calculated quarterly.

are two components.

There

The first is an equalization fee.

It

is the difference between the yalue of the amount of feed

grain required to produce one kilogram of broiler in [say]

West Germany, and the yalue of the same amount of feed grain
at the world market price.

The second component is an

amount equal to 7 percent of the SGP in effect during the

preyious 12-month.

Additional Variable Leyies are set when

import prices fall below the SGP.

Exporters are paid refunds to sell excess EC products
at world prices.

Export Refunds constitute the Export

mechanism, and are based on the difference between the
8

internal EC market price and the world market price at ports
where the EC exports.

Export refunds are paid from the EC

budget which is primarily funded by import levies collected.

The CAP, while attempting to achieve its objectives,
has increased European agricultural production and trade.
On the other hand, it has increased production cost,
inflated domestic prices and subsidized exports.

CAP'S

policies have protected European markets from outside
imports.

This protection has developed at the expense of

the EC consumers who have sustained the cost of protection

by reducing their consumption.

Non-EC poultry producers

have also been affected by the surpluses in the EC which
have been placed on world markets, causing prices to fall.

Table 1 presents poultry producer prices in the leading
producing nations.

It shows that the EC has the highest

producer prices among the leading producing nations.

Table 1

Producer Price of Poultry

($/ton)

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

EC

1223

1176

1113

1391

1566

1801

Japan

1010

1014

1043

1119

816

666

U.S.A.

839

879

1056

973

1072

878

Brazil

703

618

679

591

732

588

*At commodity-specific exchange rate.
Source:

Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidv

Equivalents.

USDA, ERS

No.803, April 1990.

Statistical Bulletin

By the mid 1970s and continuing into the 1980s

protectionist measures such as nontariff trade barriers
became the common part of intra-EC trade relations.

As the

internal trade barriers grew, trade and economic growth
diminished, and the term "Eurosclerosis" was coined.

The 1992 Initiative

Most European leaders realized that internal

protectionist measures were to blame for at least part of
the EC's economic problems.

passed in 1985.

The Single European Act was

Known as the "1992" initiative, the Act's

main objective was to harmonize the regulations that control
economic activities within the EC.

The Act was developed to

bring various national support prices under a uniform EC

support price.

In addition, the Act would remove nontariff

barriers within the EC, and bring the community closer to

the ideal of a unified customs union.

The expected benefits

included greater production efficiency, possible reductions
in national monopolies, and increased access to goods and

services to people in the EC.

Leon and Mahe have noted that

the 1992 measures are expected to affect the environment of
the EC's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), but not the CAP
directly.

If the 1992 harmonization program is to be realized,

most agricultural incentives must be abolished.
imperative that the EC:
10

It is also

1) End collection of MCAs at the borders to achieve
uniform prices within the Community;

2) scrutinizes

all national programs, including quotas and national

production incentives from conflicting with the 1992
program;

3) harmonizes taxes on agricultural inputs

and products;

4) harmonizes regulations in economic

sectors that affect agricultural production and
income; and

5) harmonizes food safety, plant, and

animal health regulations.

The removal of these incentives in the EC will reduce

distortions in agricultural commodity trade and permit more
efficient allocation of scarce resources.

Producers will be

encouraged to adopt techniques that improve food production
and compelled to become more efficient to compete in the
global markets.
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CHAPTER III

EC POULTRY PRODUCTIOH AND TRADE

Poultry meat production in the EC has been on the

increase over the past 20 years.

Currently, EC's production

is about 63 percent of U.S. output. (USDA March, 1990).

The

four major EC producers are France, the U.K., Italy, and
Spain.

France accounts for 24 percent of total poultry

produced in the EC.

Exporting 28 percent of total

production, France has been the world's leading exporter of

poultry for several years.

During 1988, the EC countries

exported a total of 2.17 billion pounds of poultry meat of
which 60 percent went to other EC countries.

The meat

directives, issued in the 1980s, provided uniform food

safety, and plant and animal regulations for the EC.
Different health and sanitary inspection standards of meat

packing plants of member countries were harmonized under the
umbrella of the EC.

The directives also required that meat

imports be limited to those plants with health and sanitary
inspection systems and regulations that are at least equal
to those of the EC.

Other directives prohibited production

and importation of meats derived from animals treated with
growth hormones.

Figure 2 shows that the EC has been

successful in going from net importer to net exporter of

poultry since 1972.

Over-production of agricultural

commodities has been largely due to income supports offered

by the Common Agricultural Policy.
12
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EXPORTS

EC IMPORT AND EXPORT OP POULTRY

Note; *Preliitiinary; #Forecast.

Data prior to 1989

represented by 5-year averages.

Source:

Dairy. Livestock, and Poultry: World Poultry

Situation.

USDA, FAS Circular Series: FL&P 3-91

August 1991.

Although EC poultry production has increased, consumption
has not kept pace with production, largely because of high
prices and lower quality.

In general, farm subsidies

offered by CAP have led to excess supplies of most
livestock, including poultry.

As a result, exporters are

offered financial supports by the EC to dispose of excess

supplies.

By protecting the internal markets from non-EC

poultry, the EC has been able to increase intra-EC poultry
trade.

Table 2 shows the flow of poultry within the EC

during 1986 to 1990.

The table indicates that most of the

poultry flowing within the EC is from other EC countries.
13

Table 2

FLOW OP POULTRY MEAT INTO EC*

flOOO Metric Tons in Readv-to-cook Ecruivalent)
Source

EC-12*

1986

1987

339.0

1988
387.0

350.0

1990

1989
398.0

464.0

Hungary

31.0

36.0

39.0

10.0

31.5

U.S.

12.4

14.6

17.7

18.1

26.9

Brazil

17.7

8.7

11.1

11.1

16.8

0.9

0.7

1.8

2.0

16.1

Thailand

*Includes intra-EC trade and major third country export of

poultry to the EC.

Source:

^Represents intra-EC trade.

Dairy. Livestock, and Poultry: World Poultry

Situation.

USDA, FAS Circular Series FL&P 3-91,

August 1991.

While non-EC producers have supplied less than 15

percent of the total poultry flowing into the EC, United
States producers have supplied less than 5 percent.

Producers are highly protected from inexpensive imports from
outside the EC through various protective import programs.

EC's protective price supports for poultry and other major

agricultural commodities are the highest among the major
agricultural producing nations.

These programs have also

kept internal poultry prices well above world levels.

With

production subsidies and export refunds on the increase
(Figure 3), EC consumer prices have averaged more than twice
the U.S. level during 1987-88.
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EC EXPORT REFUNDS FOR POULTRY

Data for 1975 and 1979 represents 5-year averages.

Source:

Agricultural Statistics of the European Community.

1960-85. USDA, ERS Statistical Bulletin No.770.

Implementation of the 1992 harmonization reforms,

according to Kelch (1989), would result in a single price
for agricultural products throughout the EC.

Movement

toward harmonization will affect the EC agriculture.

For

instance, elimination of green rates will bring grain prices
to equilibrium in the EC.

Poultry production will be

affected as feed prices fall.

Poultry producers in the EC will benefit from lower
feed costs and increase their production.

Consumption may

increase due to lower internal poultry prices.

However, the

elimination of producer incentives may also reduce

production as inefficient producers collapse.
15

Impacts on U.S. Poultry Industry

Even though CAP'S policies have strengthened European

agriculture through various production and marketing
subsidies, they have distorted the world market for
agricultural commodities.

Over the years, U.S. poultry

exports have declined to less than 10 percent of production.
At present, less than 4 percent of the total value of U.S.

poultry exports goes to the EC (Figure 4).

21.8%
42.6%

4.0%

12.9%
18.8%

□ Othtr ^ A>la ^ UMn Am«ric« ^ U.S.S.R. B E-C. |

Figure 4
Source:

U.S. Poultry Meat Export Value by Destination
(Percentages)

Adapted from Dairv. Livestock, and Poultry:
World Poultry Situation. USDA, FAS Circular Series:
FL&P 3-91.

August 1991.
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The EC countries, particularly France, have been

exporting more than 25 percent of their poultry production.
Not only has the EC displaced U.S. poultry exports from the
European markets, the EC has also displaced the U.S. from
other markets, particularly, from the Middle East markets.

The overall impacts of the harmonization of Europe will
involve three general effects.

The first effect will

consist of trade creation opportunities for firms within the
Economic Community.

Trade between EC nations will increase

with the removal of trade barriers.

EC nations with

comparative advantages in the production of certain goods
will benefit from increased demand.

Increased intra-EC

trade may displace non-EC countries.
A second effect will involve trade diversions for firms
and nations outside the EC.

In one case, the removal of

interior trade barriers and constraints will cause EC

nations to trade with other Community nations rather than
with countries outside the Community.

In the second case,

trade diversion will result from the loss of special trading

arrangements that some countries outside the EC enjoyed with
individual nations in the EC.

The third effect of the harmonization will result from

product substitution due to changes in relative prices of
goods within each EC country. How open a nation's food

supply was before 1992 and the impact of loss or addition of
markets, will determine the extent of product substitution.
17

The net benefit will be trade diversion to efficient

producers.

U.S. poultry producers may benefit as they have

higher feed conversion rates and lower cost of production
than the rest of the world.

The level of harmonized prices,

however, is crucial if the U.S. is to enjoy the benefits of
liberalized trade.

Prices harmonized at the high levels,

would require trade barriers to prevent entry of inexpensive
imports from the rest of the world.

In this case, U.S.

producers will be displaced from the EC market completely.
But if prices are harmonized at the world levels, then the
EC poultry market may be opened for U.S. poultry.

For at

the world price level, EC will not need market protective
programs to stabilize price.

EC producers would need to

become more efficient to compete with non-EC producers.

18

CHAPTER

U.S.

IV

POULTRY PRODUCTION AND TRADE

Poultry meat is a major source of animal protein.
World poultry production accounted for 22 percent of all
meat produced in 1988.

The United States produced 28

percent of the total world production of about 73 billion
pounds.

Most states in the U.S. produce poultry, however,

Alabama, Arkansas and Georgia are the leading producers.

Most producers are vertically integrated firms with access

to adequate capital and research and development techniques
(USDA, March 1990).

While the number of firms engaged in poultry production
has declined, total poultry production has increased

rapidly.

Factors leading to the rapid increase in U.S.

production include, technical advances, organizational
restructuring, and increased consumer demand (USDA, March
1990).

Efficiency in feed conversion has allowed lower

production cost and lower prices for consumers.

Modern

production innovations enable producers to enjoy the
benefits of economies of scale.

United States producers

have an advantage over their foreign competitors in the
adoption of new production techniques to meet increased
demand at lower cost because of their access to adequate

capital and research and development techniques.
Direct production subsidization by the U.S. government
has been minimal, compared to production subsidies paid by
19

the EC.

Subsidized loans, government research, inspection

services, and special tax provisions are the major U.S.
government support programs.

As a result, during the period

1982-87 the aggregate measure of government support, the
Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), for poultry averaged 10.2

percent (Table 3).

PSE for poultry is among the lowest for

U.S. agricultural commodities.

The PSE over the same period

for 12 major commodity market basket averaged 26.2 percent.

The EC's and Japan's PSEs for poultry for the same period
averaged 31.3 and 22.5 percent, respectively.

EC has

significant involvement in poultry production in the form of
production and export incentives to producers and exporters
respectively.

Table 3

Producer Subsidy Equivalents for Poultry Meat*
1987

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

EC

22

33

25

30

34

44

Japan

25

23

23

21

21

22

U.S.A.**

5

5

5

6

Countrv

Brazil

8

5

12

4

14
1

26
2

*As ratio to producer's value.
**1986 and 1987 figures are due to the introduction of the
Export Enhancement Program.
Source:

Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidv

Equivalents. USDA, ERS Statistical Bulletin
No.803,

April 1990.
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Trade distorting policies were virtually non-existent
in the U.S. poultry industry until the announcement of the
Export Enhancement Program (EEP) on May 15, 1985.

For poultry, the purpose of EEP was to help U.S.

exporters meet the challenges posed by subsidized
competitors, particularly the EC, in major U.S. markets.
EEP has helped to increase U.S. poultry exports.

About 24

percent of all U.S. poultry exports during 1987 occurred
under EEP (USDA, March, 1990).

Trade with the EC

Agricultural trade is an important part of U.S.-EC
trade relations.

However, its importance fluctuated

significantly in the 1980's.

U.S. exports of agricultural

products to the EC totaled $2.3 billion in 1970, peaked at
$11 billion in 1980, and fell 41 percent to $6.5 billion by
1985 (Farmline).

Exports have provided the needed avenues to relieve the
United States' market of excess broilers.

Reportedly, 4

million pounds of broilers were exported in 1945.

figures had reached 180 million pounds by 1960.

Export

Exports to

West Germany alone increased from 4 million pounds in 1956,
to 152 million in 1962 (Talbot, R.B).

Large shipments were

also exported to Netherlands, France, Italy and BelgiumLuxembourg.

United States broiler exports to the EC have

suffered considerably over the years.
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Denmark and some

Eastern European countries have competed with the U.S. for
the EC market.

Protectionist measures have eroded the U.S.

market shares in the EC and other markets.

Today, U.S.

poultry exports to the EC represent less than 4 percent of
total poultry exports.

United States Department of

Agriculture (USDA) reported that, the value of poultry

exports to EC was down 45 percent during the period 1961-63.
The value declined again by 45 percent during 1965-1967.
Nevertheless, United States continues to be the world's

leading producer of poultry (Table 4).

Advances in

technology and industrial reorganization have resulted in a
more efficient poultry feed conversion in the U.S. than in
the major EC producing countries.

This has reduced cost of

poultry production considerably.

Table 4

MAJOR WORLD PRODUCERS OF POULTRY MEAT

f1.000 Metric tons in readv-to-cook equivalent)
1990
U.S.A

9,105

9,426

10,105

10,878

11,387

11,838

EC-12

5,869

6,093

6,298

6,512

6,650

6,755

U.S.S.R.

3,126

3,184

3,300

3,300

3,250

3,200

CHINA

2,040

2,744

2,840

3,229

3,600

4,000

BRAZIL

1,865

1,997

2,139

2,416

2,643

2,780

'preliminary; ^Forecast.
Source:

Dairv. Livestock, and Poultrv: World Poultrv

Situation.

USDA, FAS Circular Series: FL&P 3-91

August 1991.
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CHAPTER

V

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter reviews studies that have examined the
basic issues surrounding the 1992 harTnonization programs.

In general, the elimination of obstacles to free internal
trade and full implementation of the 1992 program will have

significant impact on the European economic growth.

Most of

the studies to date, reflect the general focus on industries
other than agriculture because many of the changes of EC

harmonization will occur in non-agricultural industries.
As noted, the effects of EC 1992 on United States

exports of poultry have received little attention.

Although

several authors have investigated the impact of 1992 on the

EC and its trading partners, most have not explicitly looked
at the effects on the agricultural markets.

The most extensive study to date is the Cecchini

Report.

It was prepared for the EC Commission in 1988.

According to the report, implementation of the 1992 program
would increase the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the EC

between 3.2 and 5.7 percent over a period of five to ten

years.

It would reduce consumer prices between 4.5 and 7.7

percent.

The 1992 program would also create between 1.3 and

2.3 million new jobs to improve the labor market.

Expansion

in economic activities would result in increased government

budget revenues by 2.2 percent of GDP.
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Trade balance would

improve between 0.7 and 1.3 percent of GDP.
Smith and Venables examined the effects of EC 1992

harmonization program on some industries.

They used

industry simulations to study the effects and the size of
the effects of changes in the internal markets of the EC.

The models used were partial equilibrium models that imposed
imperfect competition and economies of scale.

The study

showed that the EC 1992 initiatives would have two principal
effects on economic welfare.

The first effect would

increase competition, expand the range of products offered
to consumers, and reduce prices.

The second effect may

result from changes in the size of firms which would lead to
better realization of the advantages of economies of scale.

The study tested two different policy experiments.

In

the first policy experiment. Smith and Venables reduced
trade barriers between member states.

They observed that

this policy increased the volume of intra-EC trade.

It

promoted competition and expanded import penetration in each
national market. They found increased firm scale, lower

average cost, and modest welfare gains in each of the ten
industries studied.

However, they said, the size of these

gains depended on returns to scale, the importance of trade
and the degree of concentration in each industry.

The second policy experiment considered firms acting in
an EC-wide integrated market, rather than in a segmented
national market.

The monopoly power of a firm in a
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particular market (for example, the domestic market), was

replaced by its average monopoly power in the EC.

In this

experiment, they found larger welfare gains in some of the
industries studied than in the first.

According to Smith and Venables, the second experiment

more realistically simulated the achievement of "completing
the internal market" than a mere reduction in trade

barriers.

However, they questioned the meaning of the

second policy experiment.

The benefits of the second

experiment are not feasible given the existing national
trade restrictions imposed by individual EC members,

together with the accompanying article 115^.

They

maintained that, in practice, actual EC policy may be some
combination of the two policy experiments.

They concluded

that, moving the EC closer to being a full custom union
would result in modest welfare gains.

They stated however,

that, more significant welfare gains can be derived from the
creation of a genuinely unified European market.

Jacquemin and Sapir believed that structural factors

were responsible for the relative slowdown in intra EC

trade.

They analyzed intra-Community trade and studied the

structural determinants of European competitiveness.

Intra-

Community trade was modeled as the ratio of intra-Community

imports to total (that is, intra- and extra-Community)
^Article 115 of the Treaty of Rome permits countries to
suspend the free circulation within the EC of extra-EC

imports, in order to support national import restrictions.
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imports.

Inter- and intra-industry determinants, barriers

to trade, and industry responses to growth in demand were

explanatory factors.

Their model distinguished factors that

influence intra-EC trade between those that result in trade

creation, and those that lead to trade diversion.

They

found that intensive human capital and skilled labor,

physical capital, and research and development all
contributed to high levels of intra-Community imports, but

they also provided resistance to increased extra-Community
imports.

They mentioned that, on one hand, factors intended

to capture the common external tariff and agri-business
policies were conducive to intra-Community trade.

On the

other hand, intra-Community trade was promoted at the

expense of greater integration into world competitiveness.
Their results implied that existing EC policies have created
trade diversions.

They proposed that EC policies should

strengthen the influence of the human capital and skilled
labor, physical capital, and research and development, and

called for gradual end to the common external tariff and
agri-business policies.

Jacquemin and Sapir opposed

temptations to create a system designed to defend intra-EC
trade against the progress of world free trade.
Winters examined several international trade policy
issues within a completed European internal market.

One was

the impact of prohibiting members from erecting inter-member
trade barriers.

Another was, the potential dangers of
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members resorting to subsidy-based protection in the
enforced absence of border measures.

He also examined the

proposition that some internal barriers were desirable to
reduce the degree of trade diversion entailed by the custom
union.

On the first issue, Winters noted that the practical
concern was the abolition of existing non-optimal barriers
to trade.

He believed that free trade was preferable to the

present situation.

According to Winters, many of the EC's

internal barriers have either been introduced or maintained

at the dictates of the pertinent industries.

Winters argued

that, because industries have influence in the policy

process and institutions in EC, elimination of internal
barriers to trade would result in considerable benefits for
the EC.

On the second issue. Winters argued that strict

measures are needed to prevent member states from replacing

border restrictions by national subsidies.

Finally, Winters

stressed the current large subsidies and significant

competition between member states.

He pointed out, that in

an economic union with free factor mobility, the costs of
subsidies increase.

Even if the costs could be justified,

independent policy-making by member states leads to extended
subsidy wars and over-subsidization.

He concluded that, EC

must abolish subsidies and eliminate barriers to intra-EC
trade.
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other studies have looked at the effects of the 1992

harmonization on producers outside the EC.

Demekas et al.

examined the effects of CAP, on the EC member states and the
rest of the world.

Demekas et al. indicated that, the

effects of CAP on the EC member states included welfare

gains and losses of producers, consumers and taxpayers.
They also included effects on other sectors and the

deadweight costs to the whole economy.

The effects on the

rest of the world included instability of world commodity
prices, and distortion of the volume and pattern of
international agricultural trade.

The study by Demekas et al. used multi-sector models to

analyze EC 1992 effects on most of the CAP commodities.

They found that large amounts of price supports paid by CAP
to farmers were inefficient.

They estimated price supports

resulted in deadweight losses of about 1 per cent of the

Community's GDP.

Demekas et al. noted that losses were not

distributed evenly among member states.

Other sectors of

the economy incurred costs as resources were diverted away
from them and their exports reduced.

The study also showed

that, traditional welfare calculations underestimated the
true social costs of operating the CAP.

CAP•s price supports had made the EC become a net

exporter of most temperate zone commodities.

The result of

the EC commodity surpluses had been to lower and vary world

prices.

They saw that this effect was especially clear in
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heavily protected sectors such as wheat, coarse grains,
ruminant meat, and dairy products.

Demekas et al. suggested

multilateral reduction of protection in agricultural markets
as a better alternative to unilateral trade liberalization
with production incentives.

Nobody knows the level at which prices will be
harmonized in the EC.

However, the common belief is that

prices after harmonization will fall between the low UK
level and the high Italian level.

Gleckler and Tweeten used

three levels of prices to study the effects of each on U.S.

food prices, production, consumption, trade with the EC and
intra-EC trade.

They used the low UK prices, the high

Italian prices, and an average of the EC prices.

Their

study used a world trade model (SWOPSIM) developed by the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to model 11

agricultural commodities, including beef and pork.

Constant

elasticities of supply and demand equations were used for
each of the commodities studied.

They included the 12 EC

member countries, the United States, Japan, and a rest—of—
world residual in the study.

In each case, they assumed

competitive markets and homogeneous commodities.
The results of the Gleckler and Tweeten's

study showed

considerable impacts on U.S. beef and pork production and

prices depending on the level at which EC prices are
harmonized.

Lower prices in the EC without price supports

for producers might lead to the collapse of inefficient
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producers; consumption would increase, and EC's export

capacity reduced.

Harmonization at the high Italian price

would reduce internal consumption, cause surpluses to build

up, and lead to increased export capacity.

The analysis

presumed a free, harmonized EC market, where MCAs and green
rates have been eliminated to remove market protection.
For harmonization at the low UK price level, the

results predicted 2.14 percent increase in U.S. beef prices.
U.S. beef production increases by 1.29 percent as producers

gain additional markets.

Beef consumption in the U.S. falls

by 0.77 percent as a result of the increase in price and
beef trade increases by 238 thousand tons. Harmonization at

the high Italian price level results in a fall in beef
prices by 1.76 percent and a fall in production by 0.46

percent.

U.S. beef consumption increases by 0.40 percent

and trade in beef falls by 99,000 tons.

In the case of pork, harmonization at the low UK price
level increases U.S. price by 4.60 percent and increases

production by 4.34 percent.

Consumption falls by 1.98

percent and trade in pork increases by 413,000 tons.
Harmonization at the high Italian price level decreases U.S.

price by 12.55 percent and reduces production by 11.01

percent.

Consumption increases by 6.12 percent while trade

in pork falls by 1.1 million tons.
Harmonization at the EC average price level showed

little impact on U.S. domestic prices, production,
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consumption and trade.

Gleckler and Tweeten's study show that higher prices in
the EC would require protectionist measures to prevent the

entry of inexpensive commodities from outside the EC.
Accordingly, it would be difficult for U.S. producers to
enter the EC market if the harmonization program leads to

increased protection.
the U.S. market.

The outcome would be excess supply in

Domestic prices would fall and consumption

increase.

Alston and Scobie used two approaches to examined the
effects on the United States of eliminating CAP policies on

poultry production, consumption and trade.

In the first

approach, poultry meat was treated as a homogeneous product.
The second approach treated poultry meat as being
differentiated by region of origin.

They found the two

models to be identical, and said whether poultry meat is

regarded as homogeneous or differentiated by consumers is an
empirical question.

The results indicated a fall in EC

exports of poultry of between 95 and 200 percent.

The study

showed between 2.5 and 16 percent drop in poultry

production.

This study found that, eliminating CAP'S

poultry policies reduced EC domestic prices by 11 percent
and raised EC domestic consumption by 6 percent.

Through

trade effects, these results would have impacts on third
countries.

For the United States, Alston and Scobie

reported an increase of between 1 and 10 percent in U.S.
31

poultry production, and 27 to 200 percent in poultry
exports.

Alston and Scobie believed the absence of the CAP

policies on poultry would result in a 20 percent increase in
total U.S. poultry exports.
increase by 0.8 percent.

U.S. poultry production would

EC's production would fall and

exports to major markets would cease.

Thus, the EC would

become a net importer of poultry.

Gleckler et al. and Alston et at., have provided

important analysis of the impact of EC harmonization on U.S.
livestock, based on the elimination of CAP programs that

affect production, consumption and trade.

However, the

effects of EC 1992 on U.S. poultry export prices remain
unknown.

Harmonization of various prices under the umbrella

of the EC will impact on the export price of the United
States'.

U.S. export price would have to adjust to the

level of the harmonized EC price.
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CHAPTER VI

METHOD AMD PROCEDURES

The general methodology used to analyze foreign markets
for U.S. agricultural commodities assumes perfectly

competitive markets and product homogeneity.

Trade

distortions due to increased support prices, together with
border taxes and intervention policies, have led to the

development of various empirical models that relax these

assumptions (Dent, Sarris and Thompson).

A simultaneous

equation model is often used to estimate price
responsiveness of demand for agricultural exports.
The basic idea of the model used in this study is that

EC poultry prices represent equilibrium results of the EC

domestic supply and demand equation.

That is, EC prices

fully capture all the market information applicable to the
supply and demand in the EC domestic markets.

The EC

quantity demand for U.S. poultry is considered to be a
residual factor that does not affect EC prices because less

than 5 percent of the total poultry consumed in the EC comes
from the United States.

Thus, U.S. poultry export prices

do not affect, or minimally affect the prices in the EC

markets.

This will be especially true during the adjustment

period for the 1992 harmonization when EC policymakers will
be pressed to ease the adjustment shocks for agricultural
production.

The implication is that poultry imports from
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outside the EC will be lessened to protect internal EC

prices from lower world prices.

This is already occurring

because, currently, U.S. poultry exports to the EC have
almost ceased.

The primary focus of the method developed for this
study concentrates on the demand for U.S. poultry by the

historically major importers in the EC.
minor importers are grouped together.

The historically

The five major

importers are West Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands and
the United Kingdom.

On the average, these countries have

accounted for over 54 percent of total value of US poultry

exports to the EC since 1985.

The minor importers are

Belgium/Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Ireland, Portugal and

Spain.

They are aggregated under the heading Rest-of-EC.

This study recognizes the difficulty involved with
capturing the overall effects of the 1992 harmonization
initiatives.

To determine the full effects of the proposed

1992 harmonization on poultry, one must go beyond measuring
the current level of agricultural protection, and include
analysis of the shifts in production, and changes in supply
and demand.

These analyses are not addressed here due to

insufficient data.

Instead, a partial model is used which

more closely represent the period after the harmonization
situation has settled.

Price elasticities of demand for

U.S. poultry exports to the EC-12 are determined and the
results used to anticipate the impact of harmonizing EC
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prices on U.S. poultry exports.

MODEL SPECIFICATION
DEMAND:

To avoid simultaneous equation bias, and also obtain
consistent parameter estimates, this study used a seeminglyunrelated-regression (BUR) procedure to estimate the export

demand for U.S. poultry by the five major EC importers and

the Rest-of-EC.

Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is

used to estimate the U.S. poultry export supply to the EC.

As noted in chapter III, poultry prices in the EC are higher
than the U.S. FOB prices.

However, U.S. poultry was assumed

to be a close substitute to the EC and other poultry.

This

substitution assumption means that if trade barriers were
liberalized, EC consumers would demand U.S. poultry or any

other poultry based on price rather than place of origin.
This assumption follows the Alston and Scobie result.
The per capita import of U.S. poultry (hereafter called

Import Demand) in country i is assumed to be a function of
foodshare of total personal expenditure, U.S. free-on-board

(FOB) price of poultry to that country, the domestic price
of poultry in that country, and the lagged quantity of U.S.
poultry imported by that country.

The import demand by EC country "i" can be specified in
log linear form as:
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Qe. = pQ + )S,Fd, + jSjPe, + jSjPd. + p^lQe. + U,

(1)

where, in country i:

Qe =

Per capita imports of U.S. poultry by country i

Fd =

Food share of total personal expenditure

Pe =

U.S. FOB price of poultry to country i at the
port of entry

Pd =

Domestic producer price of poultry in
country i

iQe =

Lagged per capita imports of U.S. poultry by
country i

U, =

The error term.

The log linear specification gives parameter estimates
that are elasticities.

The import demand model hypothesized

that the income effect as represented by Fd would be

negative.

That is, as Fd goes up, the quantity of U.S.

poultry consumed goes down.

Fd was chosen over the income

variable to avoid inherent collinearity problems between

income and price variables.

Furthermore, the harmonization

program is expected to drive prices down and increase
income.

While this may increase consumption, it will lower

the foodshare of personal expenditure.

The effect of own-price (Pe) on per capita imports of

U.S. poultry is hypothesized to be negative.

The EC

domestic poultry price (Pd) is included to capture the
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cross-price relationships for the U.S. poultry.

High market

protection programs lead to high domestic EC prices.

An

increase in Pd, all else being equal, will increase per
capita imports of U.S. poultry.

The lagged quantity

variable (iQe) serves to capture the effects of changes in
tastes and preferences for U.S. poultry.

SUPPLY;

The supply of U.S. poultry to the European Community
was estimated as a price dependent equation using the
aggregate import demand quantities and average FOB prices
over EC countries in order to avoid estimating complex

multi-country supply models.

The aggregate FOB price to the

EC is defined as a function of aggregate import demand
quantities by the EC (Qx), U.S. export capacity, for which
the beginning stock of poultry (Qt), and the domestic U.S.
prices (Pu) served as proxies, and a lagged aggregate FOB

prices variable.

The model was specified in log linear form

as :

Px = Yo + YiQx + YgQt + Y3PU + Y4IPX + Uj

(2)

where:

Px = aggregate U.S. FOB export price of poultry
to the EC

Qx = aggregate export quantity of U.S. poultry
to the EC

Qt = U.S. annual beginning stock of poultry
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Pu = domestic price of poultry in the U.S.

IPx = lagged aggregate FOB export price of poultry
to the EC

Ug =

the error term

The underlying hypothesis of the supply equation is
that as the aggregate U.S. poultry exports (Qx) to the EC

increase, the aggregate U.S. export price (Px) is expected

to increase.

The aggregate U.S. export price to the EC is

expected to fall as the domestic stock of poultry increases.
U.S. domestic poultry price and the export price are

positively related.

The lagged export price variable serves

to capture changes in the propensity to consume U.S.
poultry.

The supply and demand models are linked together by a
set of identities:

6

S Qe,. = Qx

(3)

i=l

6

(Z Qe.Pe,.)/Qe,. = Px

(4)

i=l

The error terms in all equations were assumed to be

normally distributed with constant variances, and zero
expected values.

The error terms were also assumed to be

contemporaneously uncorrelated with each other to the extent
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that the EC policies will interfere with the results.

The

complete model, comprising six demand relations, one

functional export supply relation, and two equilibrium
identities, is written as:

DEMAND:

Qe, = Pq + /3,Fd, + /SgPe, + iSjPd,. + jS^lQei = 1,

SUPPLY:

(5)

6

Px = Yo + YiQx + Y2Qt + Y3PU + Y4IPX

(6)

6

EQUILIBRIUM IDENTITIES:

S Qe, = Qx

(7)

i=l
6

(S Qe,Pe,)/Qei = Px

(8)

i=l

From the assumptions, the signs of the parameter
estimates are expected as follows:

DEMAND:
SUPPLY:

< 0, P2

^

^ ^

^ ^

Yi > 0, Y2 < 0' Y3 > 0/ Y4 > 0

DATA AND VARIABLES:

Annual data from 1965 to 1987 for the U.S. poultry

exports to the EC countries were obtained from various
issues of the Commodity Trade Statistics (United Nations)

This publication also provided data for intra-EC poultry
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trade.

The Agricultural Statistics of the European

Community of the USDA provided the domestic producer prices
data for the EC countries.

Annual currency exchange rates,

wholesale price indexes, and population figures for the EC
countries were obtained from the International Financial

Statistics (International Monetary Fund).

The personal food

consumption and total personal expenditures in each EC
nation were also obtained from the International Financial

Statistics.

United States FOB export price and production

data were obtained from various issues of USDA Poultry

Situation and Outlook Reports and the Foreign Agricultural

Trade of the United States publications.

The U.S. FOB export prices and the EC producer prices

expressed in each country's currency per metric tons were
converted to dollars per 100 kilograms.

The U.S. FOB export

price (Pe) to the major importing countries, and the
domestic producer price (Pd) in each country were computed
as:

Pe, = XPCP,/WPR,
Pd, = PTP,/WPR,
where:

XPCP, = unit export price to country i
(U.S. dollars per 100 kilograms)

WPR, = Wholesale price index of the ith country,
(1980 = 100)

PTP, = domestic producer price of poultry in the ith
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country.

Foodshare of total personal expenditure was computed as:

Fd, = FOD/PFCj
where:

Fdj = Food share of total personal expenditure
FOD,. = Annual personal food expenditure

PFCj = Annual total personal consumption expenditure
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CHAPTER

VII

RESULTS

Before presenting the results of this study, some
econometric issues associated with the model have to be

clarified.

Consistent data on U.S. poultry exports to the

EC-12 were not available until 1965.

Hence, the period from

1965 to 1987 was covered by this study.

The Durbin-Watson

test could not be used to test for first-order serial

correlation due to the presence of a lagged dependent

variable in the equations.

Pindyck and Rubinfeld have

suggested the use of the Durbin h-statistic test instead.
The test is specified as:

h = (1- M)(
2

T

)'^

1 - T[Var()9)]

where DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic, T is the number of

observations, and Var(/9) is the variance of the coefficient
of the lagged dependent variable.

The value h is normally

distributed with a mean of zero and variance of 1.

The

normal distribution table was used to test for first-order

serial correlation.

The hypothesis tested was:

Ho:

no serial correlation

Ha:

serial correlation
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For significance level of 0.05, and critical values of
0.1736, 0.2206, 0.1075, 0.0655, 0.3821, and 0.4052 (one-

tailed-test), there was not sufficient evidence to reject
the null of no serial first order autocorrelation for all

the equations.
The SAS collinearity diagnostics for the parameter
estimates (Appendix) indicated

collinearity among the U.S

export prices (Pe) and the domestic prices of poultry (Pd)
for German, Italian and the Netherlands demand equations.
These countries are among the original EC members and have
protected their markets from poultry imports.

The minimum

prices at which non-EC poultry may reach an EC port of entry
are set quarterly by the EC Commission in order to protect

the EC poultry market.

The import prices facing consumers

in these countries have been distorted by the addition of
various import levies to the minimum import prices.

For

this reason, non-EC poultry prices reaching these countries
may closely follow the EC prices.
The diagnostics also showed collinearity among
foodshare and the domestic prices variables for the U.K. and

the Rest-Of-EC demand equations.

The diagnostics failed to

show collinearity in the Greek demand equation.

Greece was

admitted into the EC in 1981, and just began transition

phase of implementing CAP policies in its domestic
agricultural market when this study ended.
The supply equation showed collinearity among the U.S.
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domestic price (Pu) and the lagged export price (IPx).

The

difficulty in estimating stable and precise parameters in
the presence of multicollinearity is recognized.

However,

the variables were retained in the model, because

elimination of one or the other, did not changed the
results.

Since harmonization of various prices is the main

concern of the 1992 initiative, parameter estimates from

this study will only be used as an indicator of the possible
direction of poultry trade between the U.S. and the EC after
the harmonization initiatives.

With these caveats, the

results of the estimated export demand functions for the

major EC importers are presented in Table 5.
Statistical significance at the 0.10 level and a
critical value of 1.341 (one-tailed-test) was chosen for

discussion reference for this study.

The F-Statistic was

significant for each equation in the model.

The

significance of the F-statistic indicates that the

coefficients of the independent variables in each equation
taken together are not zero.

The goodness-of-fit (R^) for the German equation
indicates that the variables explained 78 percent of the
variation in quantity of U.S. poultry demanded.

The

estimated parameters on Pe, Pd and IQe have the expected

signs, and were statistically significant except for IQe.
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Ul

-8.388

U.K.

OF-EC

-0.795*

2.256*

(0.71)

2.054*
(0.43)

-0.645*
(0.33)

-1.343*
(0.22)

-2.073*
(1.25)
-2.876*
(0.86)

"values in parenthesis are standard errors,

2.166*

(3.06)

2.761

(0.96)

2.251*

1.597*
(0.47)

(0.56)

(1.95)

-1.260

(0.85)

-0.836

-1.621*
(0.48)

(0.34)

(Pd)

Domestic
Price

1.328*
(0.46)

1.367*
(0.64)

*Significant at .10 level

-6.973

(2.61)

REST-

(4.54)

(8.94)

1.677

(1.55)

-0.928

LANDS

NETHER

ITALY

1.718

(3.62)

6.641

(4.65)

(0.94)

GREECE

3.639*

(Pe)

(Fd)

U.S.

Price

Foodshare

4.519

(2.26)"

Constant

(0.09)

0.595*

0.672*
(0.15)

(0.20)

0.153

(0.17)

-0.032

0.299*
(0.17)

(0.17)

0.181

Lagged
Qty.
(IQe)

0.91

0.71

0.38

0.90

0.76

0.78

r2

ESTIMATED IMPORT DEMAND FUNCTIONS FOR U.S. POULTRY BY THE EC

GERMANY

TABLE 5

0.24

0.30

1.51

1.24

0.77

0.94

Durbin-h
Statistic

This suggests past per capita imports may have no impacts on
current German imports of U.S. poultry.

The foodshare

variable was significant, but has a positive sign.
The Greek equation has

0.76.

All the variables

had the expected signs and were all statistically

significant except for Foodshare (Fd).

This implies that

per capita imports of U.S. poultry may not be significantly
affected by foodshare of personal consumption expenditure in
Greece.

The

for the Italian equation was 0.90.

The

coefficients on Fd and Pd have positive signs and are
statistically significant.

The coefficients on Pe and IQe

have negative signs, but are not statistically significant,
suggesting imports of U.S. poultry are not

critically determined by either the U.S. export price or the
previous imports.
The measure of goodness-of-fit for the Netherlands

equation was 0.38, with all variables having the expected
signs except Fd.
significant.

However, only Fd was statistically

This indicates that the variables may not be

adequate to explain variations in the U.S. poultry exports
to the Netherlands.

Although the Netherlands import poultry

meat from the U.S., they are also one of the leading poultry
meat exporters in the world.

Most of their exports are

destined for other EC members (Bishop, Christensen, Mercier
and Witucki).

Thus, their imports of U.S. poultry may be
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other factors not included in this equation.
The equations for the U.K. and the Rest-of-EC have
measure of goodness-of-fit of 0.71 and 0.91 respectively.
All the variables in each equation have the expected signs.
Both equations have all variables being statistically
significant.
Specific elasticities of individual EC nations' demand
for the U.S. poultry could not be found in the literature
for comparison.

In the absence of such information, the

estimated EC demand elasticity for the U.S. poultry will be
used as a weighted average elasticity in all EC nations.

The study by Tvedt et al. reported own-price elasticity

of -0.151 for the EC demand for U.S. poultry.

The Economic

Research Service (ERS) of the United States Department of
Agriculture uses own-price elasticity of demand of -0.90 for
the EC.

These two elasticities will constitute own-price

elasticity range for comparison.

The major EC importers of U.S. poultry in this study
are Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands and the U.K.

As

shown in Table 5, the own-price elasticity estimates for
these nations are -0.795, -1.621, -0.836, -1.260 and -0.645

respectively.

The own-price elasticity estimates for

Germany and the U.K. fall within the elasticity range and
are both significant.

The

own-price elasticity for Greece

is higher in absolute terms than the elasticity range
however, it is significant.

Expansions in poultry
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production in Greece since being admitted in the EC may

explain its high elasticity.

The own-price elasticity for

Italy falls within the elasticity range, but is not
statistically significant.

The own-price elasticity

estimates for the Netherlands was higher in absolute terms,

but was not significant.

Minor importers of U.S. poultry within the EC are

represented by Rest-of-EC.

Their own-price elasticity

estimates is -1.343, which is higher in absolute terms than

the elasticity range, and it is significant.

The high

elasticity for the Rest-of-EC may be explained by France and
Spain's position as leading poultry producers and exporters.

The cross-price elasticity, Pd, is significant in all
the equations except for the Netherlands.

The elasticity

estimates are high and suggest quantities of U.S. poultry
demanded by these countries are influenced more by the
domestic prices than the U.S. FOB prices.

The impact of the lagged exports (IQe) variable is
significant only for Greece, the U.K. and the Rest-of-EC.
The implication is that the quantity imports for U.S.

poultry in these nations are not influenced by past imports,
or any sort of institutional habit formation.
Table 6 presents the results of the U.S. poultry export

supply function.

The F-Statistic was significant,

suggesting that the coefficient of at least one of the
explanatory variables is not equal to zero.
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TABLE 6

ESTIMATED SUPPLY FUNCTION FOR U.S. POULTRY
EXPORTS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Constant

-1.403

(2.06)"

U.S.

U.S.

U.S.

Lagged

Exports
(Qx)

stock

Price

Price

(Qt)

(Pu)

(IPX)

0.817*
0.601
-0.159*
0.124
(0.20)
(0.46)
(0.19)
(0.11)

R2

Durbin-h
Statistic

0.84

0.02

*Signifleant at 0.10 level
**Values in parenthesis are standard errors.

The measure of goodness-of-fit (R^) indicates 84
percent of the variations in U.S. poultry export price to
the EC are explained by the variables in the model.

The

coefficient on U.S. export quantity (Qx) has the wrong sign
but is statistically significant.

The negative sign of the

Qx variable may be because the price at which non-EC poultry

enters any EC port of entry is set by the EC Commission in
advance.

The parameter estimates on the U.S. beginning stock
variable also has the wrong sign and is not statistically
significant.

Since the early 1970s, the U.S. has consumed

about 95 percent of its annual production of broiler meat
and exported about 5 percent.

There has not been

accumulation of stocks to affect export price, hence the

possible explanation for the positive sign on the stock
variable.

Also, a stock variable for poultry in an annual
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model may not be especially informative given the short
productive cycles for poultry.
The U.S. domestic price variable shows the expected

sign, but is not statistically significant.

This suggests

that U.S. domestic price has little impact on the export
price.

The lagged U.S. export price variable (IPx), showed the

expected sign and is statistically significant, suggesting
that lagged U.S. export prices have significant effect on
the export price.

This may also be due in part to the

consistently high EC market prices, which given the EC's
protectionist policies may have institutionalized U.S.
export prices.
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CHAPTER

VIII

SUMMARY AMD CONCLUSION

The 1992 economic integration calls for actions to

improve the functioning of the EC 's internal market.

One

such action is the harmonization of agricultural prices.
The extent to which the 1992 Harmonization will affect U.S.
poultry exports to Europe is based on three factors:

1) European political pressure to prohibit imports of U.S.
poultry as the European producers adjust to a "borderless"
Europe;

2) the magnitude of poultry price declines in the

EC; and 3) the effect that harmonization will have on

consumer incomes, especially as it relates to the foodshare
of their total personal expenditures.

The results of this study cannot be used to analyze the
effects of political actions.

Nonetheless, it is apparent

that these pressures have currently brought a halt to U.S.

poultry exports to the EC, under the guise of a phytosanitary regulations.
However, the results of this study can be used to
examine the effects of the 1992 Harmonization on U.S.

poultry exports to the EC through the changes EC domestic

poultry prices and income related factors.

In general, if

1992 Harmonization is successful in revitalizing European
economies, then the prospects for U.S. poultry exports will
be affected by increased European incomes, and lowered EC
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domestic poultry prices, due to more efficient use of

agricultural resources.

Of course, lowered EC domestic

prices will not necessarily lead to lowered European trade
barriers.

As a result, price competition in EC markets

between U.S. and EC producers would remain problematic.
The following summary focusses on the import demand

system results for U.S. poultry, which were estimated using
seemingly-unrelated-regression procedure.

The supply

function for U.S. poultry exports to the European Community,
which was estimated using OLS regression techniques will
also be incorporated to indicate how changes in exports to
the EC will affect U.S. export prices.

The demand system results indicate that imports of

poultry by Germany are influenced by foodshare of personal

consumption expenditure, U.S. export price and the domestic
price of poultry in Germany.

Thus, if the 1992

harmonization is successful, then U.S. poultry exports are

expected to be reduced.

Given that foodshare of personal

expenditures is expected to decrease as income in the EC
increases and EC domestic poultry prices will decline as a

result of reduced input costs, the positive coefficient for
the foodshare variable and the domestic price elasticities

of 2.256 indicates that consumption of U.S. poultry will
decrease.

The inelastic U.S. own-price elasticity of -0.795

implies that lowered U.S. prices will not dramatically
improve export opportunities in the EC.
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U.S. exports of poultry to Greece are influenced by
U.S. export price, the domestic poultry price in Greece and

the lagged per capita imports of U.S. poultry.

The elastic

U.S. own-price elasticity of -1.621 indicates that exports
to Greece are sensitive to price changes.

However, the

Greek domestic cross-price elasticity of 1.597 suggests

domestic poultry production is viewed as a close substitute
for U.S. poultry.

Thus, if increased poultry production or

EC shipments to Greece results in lowered prices, then the
U.S. producers will be faced with increased competition in
the Greek market.

Foodshare of the personal consumption expenditure and
the domestic price of poultry are the major forces affecting
U.S. exports of poultry to Italy.

As in Germany, the

coefficients for these variables indicate that U.S. exports

to Italy will be reduced as a result of 1992 harmonization.
The Italian cross-price elasticity at 2.25 indicates that
Italian poultry is a close substitute for U.S. poultry.
Thus, if Italian poultry prices decline as a result of the
harmonization process, U.S. poultry exports to Italy will
decline.

The only significant variable influencing per capita
poultry imports of the Netherlands was foodshare.

However,

as noted in Chapter VII, multicollinearity concerns negate

any confidence the coefficient estimate.

Thus, the

multicollinearity concern along with the equation Rj of 0.38
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suggests variations in the imports of U.S. poultry by the
Netherlands are not adequately explained by model developed.
Nonetheless, this lack of explanation may indicate that

economic factors such as prices and income do not play major
roles in determining U.S. poultry exports to the
Netherlands.

The demand equation results indicate that imports of U.S.
poultry by U.K. and the Rest-of-EC are influenced by
foodshare, U.S. export price, the domestic prices and the
lagged per capita imports of U.S. poultry.

The foodshare

elasticities of -2.073 and -2.876 imply that U.S. poultry

exports may increase to these nations, if the 1992
Harmonization is successful.

The U.S. own-price elasticities for poultry are
inelastic in the U.K. and elastic in the Rest-of-EC.

The inelastic own-price elasticity of -0.645 implies that
lowered U.S. export price will not induce significant
increase in U.S. poultry exports to the U.K. market.

However, the elastic own price elasticity of -1.343
indicates that U.S. poultry exports to the Rest-of-EC are
responsive to price changes.
Domestic cross-price elasticity for the U.K. and the

Rest-of-EC is 2.166 and 2.054 respectively.

These

elasticities are indications that domestic poultry

production in the U.K. and the Rest-of-EC are accepted as
close substitutes for U.S. poultry.
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Therefore, increased

poultry production in these countries will result in less
imports of U.S. poultry.
United States poultry exports to the EC have not been

stable during the past two decades.

As indicated by figure

4, less than 4 percent of total value of U.S. poultry

exports currently goes to the EC.

Domestic EC policies

while promoting domestic production, have also increased
poultry prices in the EC and reduced imports.
The results of the supply function of U.S. poultry

exports to the EC shows that the U.S. export price is
influenced by the quantity exported and the lagged price
variables.

The price flexibility of -0.159 implies that

U.S. exporters are very responsive to price changes.

Because the import prices set by the EC Commission are
invariably lower than the world market prices, non-EC

poultry exporters have remained sensitive to the export
price.

Consequently, if the harmonization program further

lowers the import price below the world market price, non-EC
exporters may seek alternative markets for their poultry.
The U.S. beginning stocks and U.S. domestic poultry
prices show no significant influence on the U.S. export

prices to the EC.

The true effects of these variables on

the export price may not be captured for the reason that
only a small amount of the total U.S. poultry exports goes
to the EC.

It is certain that the 1992 harmonization program will
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involve many changes in the domestic EC market.

However,

because the dynamics of the changes are more often

politically instigated, not all of these changes can be

captured in the model used in this study.

This study has

shown the strong influence that domestic EC prices have on
demand for U.S. poultry.
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Collinearity Diagnostics for the German Demand Equation
Variance Proportion
Condition
Number
Intercept

Variable

Intercept

Pe

lOe

Pd

1.00000

0.0000

0.0001

0.0001

0.0000

0.0001

20.40778
44.18761
90.73068

0.0006
0.0110
0.9652

0.1349
0.0112
0.3952

0.0140
0.2896
0.0010

0.0001
0.0161
0.0904

0.0575
0.4197
0.3638

101.29789

0.0232

0.4586

0.6953

0.8935

0.1589

Fd
Pe
Pd

iQe

Fd

Collinearity Diagnostics for the Greek Demand Equation
Variance Proportion
Condition

Variable
Intercept

Number

Intercept

Fd

Pe

Pd

lOe

1.00000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0001

0.0001

0.0006

Fd
Pe

12.32184

0.0040

0.0130

0.0028

0.0219

0.0599

14.14462

0.0001

0.0000

0.0197

0.0146

0.4178

Po

63.18024

0.0137

0.0070

0.9741

0.9143

0.2767

107.26061

0.9822

0.9799

0.0033

0.0491

0.2450

IQe

Collinearity Diagnostics for the Italian Demand Equation
Variance Proportion
Condition

Variable

Number

Intercept

Fd

Pe

Pd

lOe

Intercept

1.00000

0.0002

0.0007

0.0000

0.0000

0.0008

Fd

5.92343

0.0004

0.0745

0.0000

0.0001

0.0617

Pe

21.74040

0.0862

0.4507

0.0047

0.0064

0.7327

Pd

35.70318

0.7937

0.0299

0.0354

0.0178

0.1292

132.66880

0.1195

0.4442

0.9599

0.9757

0.0756

IQe
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Collinearity Diagnostics for the Netherlands Demand Equation
Variance Proportion

Variable

Condition

Number

Intercept

Fd

Pe

Pd

lOe

Intercept

1.00000

0.0001

0.0047

0.0001

0.0000

0.0029

Fd

5.96194

0.0003

0.6646

0.0001

0.0001

0.1119

Pe

9.00007

0.0022

0.1457

0.0030

0.0011

0.7154

Po

59.02408

0.5999

0.0220

0.3950

0.0013

0.1688

105.23599

0.3975

0.1629

0.6018

0.9975

0.0010

IQe

Collinearity Diagnostics for the United Kingdom Demand
Equation
Variance Proportion

Variable

Intercept

Condition
Number
Intercept

Fd

Pe

Pd

lOe

1.00000

0, 0000

0.0001

0.0002

0.0001

0.0010

Fd

15.01681

0, 0022

0.0642

0.0057

0.0009

0.4639

Pe

16.57453

0, 0002

0.0263

0.0590

0.0138

0.5234

Pd

46.46577

0, 0401

0.0634

0.8725

0.1883

0.0005

105.24532

0, 9575

0.8459

0.0625

0.7969

0.0113

IQe

Collinearity Diagnostics for the Rest-of-the-EC Demand
Equation
Variance Proportion
Variable

Condition
Number
Intercept

Fd

Pe

Pd

lOe

Intercept

1.00000

0.0001

0.0003

0.0008

0.0001

0.0023

Fd
Pe
Pd

7.80996

0.0002

0.0030

0.0748

0.0026

0.4162

14.35624

0.0053

0.1242

0.2317

0.0005

0.5488

27.89275

0.0176

0.3093

0.6882

0.1990

0.0318

IQe

69.01909

0.9767

0.5632

0.0045

0.7978

0.0010
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Collinearity Diagnostics for the Export Supply Equation
Variance Proportion
Condition

Variable
Intercept
QX
Qt
Pu
IPX

Number

Intercept

Ox

Qt

Pu

iPx

1.00000

0.0000

0.0001

0.0000

0.0000

0.0001

32.81352
55.44193

0.0212
0.0001

0.0037
0.5717

0.0086
0.048

0.0003
0.0492

0.4020
0.0017

110.48306
134.51932

0.4121
0.5666

0.0850
0.3395

0.853
0.089

0.0924
0.8581

0.0212
0.5750
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